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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bills and Notes-Depository Bank As Holder in Due Course1
Walnut Cove Motor Company was a depositor of plaintiff State
Planters Bank and, as of the close of business October 17, 1957, had a
balance of 712 dollars, against which there were then awaiting payment
its checks in an amount over 12,000 dollars received that afternoon by
the bank in the mail from its correspondents. The president of the bank
told Massey, the president of the motor company, that unless he, got
funds in to cover these waiting checks by noon the next day, October 18,
they would be returned dishonored to the presenting banks. To raise
the demanded funds Massey sold to defendant the next morning in
Charlotte at full price several cars which were burdened with mortgages
and received defendant's check for over 11,000 dollars payable to the
motor company. He deposited this check with a few other small items
to the credit of the motor company and the bank forthwith paid the
waiting checks which the deposit was to cover. The defendant having
learned of the fraud perpetrated on it, stopped payment on its 11,000
dollar check, and since the motor company thereafter never made any
deposits of consequence 2 and its president, Massey, disappeared, 3 the
bank could not collect from the account or the depositor the money it
had put out on the strength of this check so it sued the defendant drawer.
If the law is to recognize any class of people who can trample under
foot the defenses of defrauded makers of commercial paper, it would
look as if this bank, admittedly without notice of the fraud and with its
money sunk beyond recall in this check should be one of such. The
court so held but not without effort because of complications introduced
by pronouncements in earlier cases.
DEPOSITORY BANK AS COLLECTING AGENT

The check in suit was indorsed 4 and presented by Massey to the
receiving teller for credit to the motor company along with a deposit

slip carrying a standard stipulation that "this Bank acts only as de1 State Planters Bank v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., 250 N.C. 466, 109 S.E.2d 189
(1959).
'lso
large amounts of additional checks of the motor company were later
presented and returned unpaid. Problems presented by the subsequent deposits
and withdrawals are dealt with in note 15, infra.
'Record, p. 28; 250 N.C. at 469, 109 S.E.2d at 192.
' The endorsement was by rubber stamp and in blank. It was admitted to
have been authorized and valid, Brief for Appellant, p. 26, although the erroneous
contention was there made that it was a restrictive endorsement under N.I.L.
§ 36(2), G.S. § 25-42(2). Of course as between the parties -by separate agreement
an agency may be created though the form of the endorsement does not disclose it
and subsequent parties would not be on notice of the agency.
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positor's collecting agent and .... it may charge back any [unpaid]
item . . . ."5 Examining the case first on the assumption that this
stipulation represented the binding agreement of the parties, it is evident
that the bank was indorsee, hence holder,6 from the moment of deposit
and could become holder for value by making advances to or on behalf
of its principal 7 even though, under our holdings, it, as agent, would
not have title or be "owner" of the paper.8 A commission merchant to
whom produce is consigned by a grower can get a lien on the produce by
advances to the shipper even though he does not get title or become
owner and the North Carolina court long since recognized the similarity
of that situation to that of advances made by a collecting bank. 9
That would seem to be an end to the matter and it would be so if
the bank in fact, as assumed above, had paid out the full amount of the
check, i.e., as collecting agent had made advances to the full amount.
Under the first in, first out rule once approved in North Carolina 0
there is no question but what the bank here did so." But where, as in
this case, the right to charge back exists, North Carolina has apparently
'Record p. 39; 250 N.C. at 469, 109 S.E.2d at 191.
NIL § 191, G.S. § 25-1: "'Holder' means the payee or indorsee of a bill or
note, who is in possession of it....

"NIL § 27, G.S. § 25-32: "Where the holder has a lien on the instrument ....

he is deemed a holder for value to the extent of his lien." National Bank of
Phoenixville v. Bonsor, 38 Pa. Super. 275 (1909) ; Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.
v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 1958). The Uniform
Commercial Code (hereafter U.C.C., now the law in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts
and Kentucky) §§ 4-208, -209, adopts and extends this doctrine by enacting the
first in, first out rule. Section 4-208(2) and comment 2.
8 The N.I.L. does not use the term "owner" though it often refers to title. Cf.
American Bankers' Ass'n Bank Collection Code (adopted in 18 states, not N.C.)
§ 2 which treats depository banks as agents absent a contrary agreement but gives
them "the rights of an owner" to the extent that a credit given has been drawn
against. See also U.C.C. § 3-301. First Nat. Bank v. Rochamora, 193 N.C. 1,
136 S.E. 259 (1926) and other cases in North Carolina even deny that the bank
as agent is the real party in interest. Cf. Wellons v. Warren, 203 N.C. 178, 180,
165 S.E. 545, 546 (1932); but see Federal Reserve Bank v. Whitford, 207 N.C.
267, 176 S.E. 584 (1934). Those decisions would probably be otherwise if the
bank had made irretrievable advances as in the present case and had thus acquired
an "interest" in the paper. See language in Ledwell v. Shenandoah Milling Co.,
215 N.C. 371, 376, 377, 1 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1939), quoted in note 9, infra. No such
claim was made. It is believed the decisions are wrong anyway under N.I.L.

§§ 37 (2) and 51.
'Armour Packing Co. v. Davis, 118 N.C. 548, 555, 24 S.E. 365, 366 (1896),
quoting from In re State Bank, 56 Minn. 119, 124, 57 N.W. 336, 337 (1894) ; Giles
v. Perkins, 9 East 12, 14 (K.B. 1807), quoted in the principal case: Ledwell
v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 215 N.C. 371, 376, 377, 1 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1939):
"[T]he bank becomes a holder of the instrument, at least as collateral."; "the
... bank has an interest in the paper ...."
0United
States National Bank v. MeNair, 114 N.C. 335, 19 S.E. 361 (1894);
Standing Stone Nat. Bank v. Walser, 162 N.C. 54, 77 S.E. 1006 (1913).
" By the close of business on October 19th the bank had paid out more on the
motor company's checks (12,303 dollars) than the sum of the company's opening
balance on October 18 (700 dollars) plus the total deposit that day of the check
in suit (11,142 dollars) and 300 dollars of small items credited at the same time.
(All sums in round figures.) Record p. 35. The deposit on the 19th of 421 dollars which kept the account from being overdrawn would be irrelevant in a first in,
first out calculation.
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held that the collecting bank cannot be a holder for value to the extent
that it can recoup from the account by charge back after it has notice of

a defect in the paper it received. 1 2 Usually that has resulted in complete defeat for the depository bank because the payee's account was

found ample to permit complete reimbursement by charging back.13
This is a purely equitable doctrine disregarding practicalities and technicalities as to when funds are paid out. There is something phony sounding in a bank's claim to the harsh special rights of a holder in due course
against defrauded parties when all it has to do to make itself whole is
to write some debit figures on its depositor's account and return the
paper to him.1 4

Here the case is different however. As a result of some small deposits and withdrawals during the ensuing two days 15 the account of
2

Worth Co. v. International Sugar Feed No. 2 Co., 172 N.C. 335, 90 S.E. 295
1916) ; Sterling Mills v. Saginaw Milling Co., 184 N.C. 461, 114 S.E. 756 (1922)
jury question whether right to charge back existed). The facts in other cases
are so clear as to require no jury finding. See, e.g., Denton v. Shenandoah Milling
Co., 205 N.C. 77, 170 S.E. 107 (1933), discussed in note 13 infra.
"3Cases cited note 12. In Denton v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 205 N.C. 77, 80,
170 S.E. 107, 109 (1933), where no deposit slip language was introduced but other
facts pointed to an agency, there was testimony that the depositor's account was
not always sufficient to stand a charge back but that would seemingly be no reason
why the bank should not get off the hook when it was. It is evident that under
the first in, first out rule an active account is likely to make the bank a holder for
value very soon while under the charge back rule a substantial balance will usually
defeat
1 4 that claim for moderate sized items.
In language of Hoke, J., dissenting in Standing Stone Nat. Bank v. Walser,
162 N.C. 54, 65, 66, 77 S.E. 1006, 1011 (1913), "[Tlhere is no evidence that ...
plaintiff, if it fails to recover, is or is likely to be out of pocket one cent by reason
of its alleged purchase," i.e., if it was denied recovery as a holder in due course
against a defrauded drawer. The implications of that statement cannot of course
be pushed too far or no one could be a holder in due course when he had an amply
solvent endorser who had received or waived notice of dishonor. The whole basic
principle of negotiability would be scrapped by such a sweeping doctrine. Limited
to the case of a bank with the right of charge back against a sufficient balance it
has equitable appeal. Accord, National Bank of Commerce v. Morgan, 207 Ala.
65, 92 So. 10 (1921) (account was always sufficient for charge back). This same
equitable approach-how is the bank hurt?-was carried to the point of technical
error in the homespun reasoning and language of the trial judge in Latham v.
Spragins, 162 N.C. 404, 78 S.E. 282 (1913), where the bank had applied the deposited item to an overdraft (pre-existing debt, N.I.L. § 25) and later, on its dishonor, had charged it back, restoring the overdraft. The bank, said that worthy
judge to the jury, "were in the same fix after the transaction as before .... "
Id. at 405, 78 S.E. at 283.
"5Record p. 35. The record is not satisfying on the matter of the small additional deposits received and the small charges made to the company's account
during this period. The president of the bank testified that it returned to correspondents unpaid a large total of checks ("way up into the thousands," Record
p. 20) which came through on October 18th and on later days because the account
was insufficient and no new funds were produced to cover them. It may be that
the bank paid some small locally held checks which were presented later though
the president's testimony was that the practice of the bank was not to pay out of
order. Record p. 27, 2d par.; cf. Record p. 2 last par. While a bank has some latitude in determining what order to follow in paying simultaneously presented items,
Chadd v. Byers State Bank, 111 Kan. 279, 206 Pac. 880 (1922); Castaline v.
National City Bank of Chelsea, 244 Mass. 416, 138 N.E. 398 (1923), it may violate
a duty to its correspondent in returning checks unpaid and paying others presented
later. See Standard Trust Co. v. Commercial National Bank, 166 N.C. 112, 122,
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the motor company stood at 124.90 dollars on October 22 when the bank
got notice of dishonor of the 11,000 dollar check of the defendant.' 0 One
might take the view that the bank was thus a holder for value only for
the amount of the check less this 124 dollars which stood on its books
subject to being appropriated under the banker's lien. That would
seem to carry out logically the theory of earlier North Carolina cases.
And had the motor company's balance been 5,000 dollars instead of 124
dollars, it is believed the court would have so limited plaintiff's recovery
7
on the fraudulently obtained check in suit.1
DEPOSITORY BANK

AS PURCHASER

So much for the case analyzed on the basis of plaintiff bank's being
a collecting agent. The complaint did not adopt that theory. It alleged
instead that the bank was the owner of the check.'
This approach of
81 S.E. 1074, 1078 (1914) (also holding the drawee on the minority, constructive
acceptance doctrine) ; Note 7 N.C.L. REV. 191 (1929). See also Jacobson v. Bank
of Commerce, 66 Ill. App. 470 (1896), which, however, was decided under the
check-as-assignment doctrine then followed in that jurisdiction. But see U.C.C.
§ 4-303(2) and comment 6 (Offic. Text, 1958).
"8Or on October 23d. Record p. 19. There was some testimony by plaintiff's
president that this 124 dollars was not a real balance because of some collateral
transaction on which the bank was "stuck." Record p. 28. That collateral transaction seems to have been substantially a duplicate on a small scale (check of 200
dollars) of the one in dispute, i.e., plaintiff bank received for deposit from the motor
company and sent through for collection a check which the motor company had
fraudulently obtained for a mortgaged car delivered to the buyer without the
assent of the mortgagee. There was however, inter alia, a striking difference: the
drawee bank on this check overlooked a stop order and paid it to plaintiff. Under
the doctrine of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr, 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762), accepted to
the full extent in North Carolina, Woodward v. Savings & Trust Co., 178 N.C. 184,
100 S.E. 304 (1919) ; National Bank of Sanford v. Marshburn, 229 N.C. 104, 47
S.E.2d 793 (1948), the drawee bank there would seem precluded from recovering
its mistaken payment from plaintiff (unless plaintiff bank as to that check were
considered to be only bare agent of the motor company, fraudulent payee, and so
without rights of its own). BUrrroN, BILts & Norzs 638 (1943). That being so,
it is questionable whether plaintiff bank by voluntarily refunding the money which
it was lawfully entitled to keep, could diminish the motor company's balance by
charging the item back and thus increase its investment in the check on which it
is now suing (i.e., become a holder for value to a larger amount).
" Of course in no realistic sense can a check of 11,000 dollars be charged back
against an account of 124 dollars. As a matter of bookkeeping it could be done
and a heavy overdraft be created but that might be a poor tactical move since it
might be regarded as relinquishing rights on the paper and substituting a claim
against the depositor on his overdrawn account, although it ought to be regarded as
still having a security interest in the paper. Cf. Latham v. Spragins, 162 N.C.
404, 78 S.E. 282 (1913). In Lowrance Motor Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 238 F.2d
625 (5th Cir. 1957), relied on in the principal case, the judgment was for less than
the amount of the items in question "the difference being represented by an amount
recaptured by the bank from Moore's account." Perhaps the court would have
so limited the judgment if the bank had not appropriated the balance.
8 "That the plaintiff is the owner and holder in due course . . . ." Complaint,
para. III, Record p. 2. The findings, para. 9, even more emphatically adopt that
theory. (The intent of the parties was that the transaction constituted a sale.)
Record p. 52; 250 N.C. at 470, 471, 101 S.E. at 192, 193. The Uniform Commercial
Code has deliberately written down in importance the matter of status, although "it
may have importance in some residual areas not covered by specific rules." U.C.C.
§ 4-201, comments 1, 2 (Official Text, 1958).
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course involves a collision with the terms of the deposit slip which declared the bank a collecting agent. The motor company listed its deposit
on that slip and would normally be considered to have adopted the
printed recital.19 But this deposit was not a normal one. The bank,
with some 12,000 dollars of the motor company's checks received from
correspondents and in hand for payment from a wholly insufficient
account, demanded that the motor company bring in fresh deposits to
prevent those checks being returned dishonored. 20 It was in response to
this demand that the motor company procured from the defendant by
fraud the check in suit and offered it to plaintiff bank to serve as the
source of funds for payment of the waiting checks. Disregarding the
agency recitals on the deposit slip and the technicalities of the parol
evidence rule it might be found (and it was found) 2 ' that the bank did
buy the check and made immediate22 payment for it by honoring that
amount or a greater amount of the motor company's checks then in hand

awaiting payment.
" See Oliver v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 176 N.C. 598, 600, 97 S.E.
490, 491 (1918) ; Coppersmith v. Aetna Ins. Co., 222 N.C. 14, 17, 21 S.E.2d 838,
839 (1942) ; 1 CoRBir, CONTRACTS §§ 32, 33 (1950). Compare cases of principal
adopting by delivery to a third party documents made out by an agent unauthorized
to execute them. Mondragon v. Mondragon, 113 Tex. 404, 257 S.W. 215 (1923).
There is authority that the deposit slip is only a receipt and its recitals are not
binding (do not create a contract), 9 C.J.S. Banks &#Banking §270 (1938), perhaps by analogy to the rule as to such stipulations on parcel checkroom tickets and
the like handed to the bailor without his advance inspection or assent. The differences however, are evident. The depositor uses the form repeatedly, he lists his
items on it and puts his name to it, perhaps not as a signature, but as a voluntary
affirmative act. He first delivers the form to the teller before the copy is returned
to him as a receipt. Opportunity to know the terms is certainly present. Some
banks go to great lengths to charge the depositor with knowledge and concurrence. A bank in the writer's vicinity, for example, prints a stipulation like that in
the principal case on the face of the slip, a somewhat differently worded one, with
charge back right repeated, on the back and the added assertion, "Delivery to the
Bank of items for collection or credit [Quaere, what distinction is intended?]
shall constitute acceptance of the above conditions by the depositor, in the absence
of written notice to the contrary at the time." Finally, the teller's rubber stamp
endorsement of the duplicate declares, "Out of town items received and forwarded
for collection at depositor's risk only until we have actual final payment" (Quaere,
what is final payment?) Compare Morris v. Cleve, 197 N.C. 253, 148 S.E. 253
(1929). At any rate many cases have treated the recital as creating a contract.
Ledwell v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 215 N.C. 371, 1 S.E.2d 841 (1939) (contract
found waived), which quotes Fine v. Receiver of Dickinson County Bank, 163 Va.
157, 160, 175 S.E. 863, 864 (1934). See also language in Taft v. Quinsigamond
Nat'l Bank, 172 Mass. 363, 52 N.E. 387 (1899) : "So a bank by general notices
printed on its pass-books or deposit slips, or otherwise brought to the knowledge
of its depositor . . . may define its position as that of agent or purchaser."
20

Record p. 15.

Findings, para. 9, Record p. 52. Since nothing was said in the conversations
between the bank and depositor about purchase or sale this is a probably permissible but certainly not a necessary interpretation of the intended agreement. The
evidence would not seem sufficient for the purpose under the agency presumption of
U.C.C. § 4-201 (1) (contrary intent must clearly appear) and comment 2 (calling
for written evidence of intent to revoke agency).
2 Because of some complications in the bank's routine, Record pp. 25-26, about
half of these checks were not debited to the motor company's account until the
next day, October 19, Record p. 35, although remittance seems to have been made
to the presenting banks on the 18th. Record pp. 33-34.
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But can the parol evidence rule properly be disregarded? Various
arguments suggest themselves. 23 One approach is to declare, as did the
opinion in the principal case, "The deposit contract is a matter about
which plaintiff and Motor Company had a legal right to make their
own contract, so long as the rights of third parties are not injuriously
affected, 24 and it is not contrary to law or public policy .... What the
contract between them is with respect to the title of this cheque depends
2
on their intention to be determined as a fact from the evidence. 5
Put in this broad form it might seem that the trier of the facts, here
the trial judge, may give controlling effect to the oral preliminary discussion which he here interprets to mean that a sale was intended,
although as so interpreted, it contradicts the printed stipulation accompanying the actual deposit. If this wide open view of the matter is taken
little seems left of the parol evidence rule, especially that rule as it has
usually been applied in North Carolina, where the test for rejection
seems to have been, Does the claimed oral agreement contradict the
ultimate writing ?26 It certainly does so here.
27
But, as pointed out by writers on evidence, the parol evidence rule
properly considered requires first a finding by the court whether under
all the circumstances the final written terms would normally be intended
by the parties to embody, "integrate" in Wigmore's word, their agreement and so render any preceding oral commitments on the specific
matter of no effect. If, objectively tested, that was not their intention,
then the jury will find whether there were in truth such oral commitments and what they were.
" If it were the depositor seeking to escape the consequences of the printed
stipulation he might try to invoke the fine print or "trap for the unwary" doctrine
recognized in some states, for the stipulation is usually in fine print. But not only
does the present fact situation seem to fit poorly into that rule (depositor repeatedly used the form and had put his name to a like stipulation on the signature
card when opening the account) but certainly the bank which furnished the form
can put forward no claim to being prejudiced. For an interesting case where such
an argument was summarily rejected see People v. Michigan Ave. Trust Co., 242
Ill. App. 579, 597 (1926).
24 This clause presents an interesting area of speculation: since in the view of
the plaintiff, and apparently of the court, the plaintiff, to extinguish defendant's
defense of fraud, must make itself out a purchaser rather than an agent, the defendant, a third party, will be most injuriously affected by allowing the intent of
the parties, as shown by their oral arrangements, to prevail.
" 250 N.C. at 472, 109 S.E.2d at 194.
2 Chadboum and McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina, 9
N.C.L. Rrv. 151, 156, 176 (1931); STANsBuRY, North Carolina E24dence, § 253
(1946). Compare: "This agreement [deposit slip stipulation] being in writing it
is not subject to contradiction by proof that another and a different agreement was
in fact at the time made." Ledwell v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 215 N.C. 371, 376,
1 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1939), quoted by the court in the present case but in another
(waiver) and without noting its bearing on this point.
connection
2
WiGmoRE, EvIDENCE, §§ 2425, 2430 (3d ed. 1940) : Chadbourn & McCormick,
szpra note 26 at 154. The statement in Neal v. Marrone, 239 N.C. 73, 78, 79
S.E.2d 239, 242 (1953), quoted in Walker v. Home, 149 F. Supp. 457, 460 (W.D.
N.C. 1957), comes close to stating the rule in the same form.
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Here there seems ample reason for finding that in special pressing
circumstances, where urgent exchanges took place between the depositor
and the top officer of the bank, it was not the intent of the parties that
a printed stock form later used in depositing with a teller the item in
question should be regarded as an integration of the transaction. That
effectively disposes of the parol evidence rule for this case and the decision can be reached, it seems, with the blessing of Mr. Wigmore.
Our supreme court in fact seemed very near to placing the matter on
this basis when just following the language quoted above and again later
in the opinion it laid emphasis on the "facts and attendant circumstances
surrounding the making of the deposit." 28 This is especially true when
the trial judge here sat as a jury and made whatever findings were to be
made.
Another way to avoid the force of the printed terms is to say, as did
the opinion, that they are in the interest of the bank, may be waived by
it and can be found to have been waived by paying the depositors checks.
It is true, as already noted, that the banks or their counsel prepare
the recitals and supply the forms on which they appear and that presumably the terms are in their interest in the sense that the stipulations
are what in general the banks want.2 9 And if, for example, the form
says that the bank will not honor checks drawn against uncollected
funds, it might later waive this restriction by nevertheless paying such
checks.
But to say that by making advances even up to the full amount of
the checks it "waives" its status of agent and becomes a buyer seems to
go beyond the normal implications of the term. The bank certainly
does not waive its right to charge back and that, in North Carolina at
least, it is a key indicator of agency.30
Nevertheless the court had ample outside and some North Carolina
authority for this position 3' and no matter how unsatisfactory it seems
analytically and how unnecessary it is as justification for finding the
bank a holder in due course, the result reached seems sound.
" Cases elsewhere have found the printed stipulations overriden by far less
impressive special facts than those here, often solely on the ground that drawings
were permitted. 59 A.L.R.2d 1173, 1187 (1958).
"' Like most other people the banks want what they think is best for their own
interests but in the complicated area of bank collections, where any position of
advantage one way may be disadvantage another, their vacillation over the years
indicates that they are not at all sure what they want. Right now they say in their
forms that they will be agents. But note the shift in position from restrictive to
unrestrictive endorsements described in First Nat'l Bank of Belmont v. First Nat'l
Bank of Barnesville, 58 Ohio St. 207, 214, 50 N.E. 723 (1898), followed by the
contrary shift in the banks' own legislation, A.B.A. Bank Collection Code § 4,
making "For Deposit" and "Pay any bank or banker" endorsements restrictive.
"'Denton v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 205 N.C. 77, 170 S.E. 107 (1933), discussed in note 13, spra.

"59 A.I.R2d 1173, 1188-89 (1958).
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SUMMARY

The court said in the present case: "The real determinative question
presented to the Trial Judge was whether plaintiff is the owner or a
collecting agency of this cheque ....

,,32

If the plaintiff had not chosen to sue as purchaser and owner 83 that
question would not have been determinative, perhaps not even important.
The N.I.L. recognizes no such person as "owner" or "owner in due
course."3 4 All that plaintiff need be is holder in due course.
Considering, however, the poor reception often accorded in North
Carolina cases to depository banks dressed in the garb of agent and that
the charge-back right is part of that garb, it is understandable why plaintiff's counsel preferred to present their client in other attire if possible.
But the crucial question for such a plaintiff in cases where it wishes
to assert rights35 against drawers or claimants 36 is not whether it is or
is not an agent but whether it has given value either by making advances, if agent, or paying part or all of the purchase price, if buyer.
And that in turn will depend in most cases on the answer to the questions what is the giving of value and when is it determined?
The following analysis and conclusions are ventured as representing
the now state of the North Carolina law :37
82250 N.C. at 472, 109 S.E.2d at 194.
"Defendant in turn largely -pinned its hopes on arguing that plaintiff was only
an agent. Understandably it would not want to becloud the issue which it thought
might give it complete victory by arguments promising only to reduce an adverse
verdict of 12,000 dollars by 124 dollars.
",See the discussion of this point in note 8, s-upra.
85 Where other questions are concerned, such as -who shall bear the loss in case
of a failed intermediary bank, the depository, charged with being owner, will of
course hasten back into its agency role and its exculpatory recitals. See a still
useful analysis of the whole area, Steffen, The Check Collection Muddle, 10 Ti-.
L. RE%. 537 (1936).
"Many of the cases where the bank seeks to be found a holder in due course
involve attachments by the depositor's creditors. Those cases are considered generally to present the same ultimate problem as ours and are cited indifferently herein
as they are by others, although owner and holder in due course are not by any
means the same. For example, a donee may be owner. There may be less public
interest in aiding creditors of payees who, as creditors, throw monkey wrenches
into the collection process by their attachments than there is in encouraging banks
to aid business by allowing drafts against items in process, especially when a very
small percentage of paper is dishonored. On the other hand the attaching creditors
are commonly local people who, without this weapon, may have to go abroad to
assert their claimed rights.
" Many cases have involved claims of out of state depository banks and those
banks might in some of them have fared better if counsel had noted the possibilities
of that fact. The legal effect of transfers, by endorsement or otherwise, is governed
by the law of the place where made. Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank [1905]
1 K.B. Div. 677, 74 L.J..K.B. 326 (Ct. App.) (leading case-forged endorsement
in Roumania) ; REsTATEmENT, CONFLiCr OF LAW, § 349 (1934) ; U.C.C. § 4-102(2).
comment c (Official text 1958) ; Hatcher v. McMorine, 15 N.C. 122, 124 (1833)
(endorser's liability). Contra, Badger Mach. Co. v. U.S. Bank & Trust Co., 166
Wis. 18, 163 N.W. 188 (1917) (transfer for pre-existing debt).
In Ledwell v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 215 N.C. 371, 374, 1 S.E. 2d 841, 843
(1939) the court said, "As to this, [the contention that Virginia law governed the
deposit in a Norfolk bank] we do not take issue," though its examination of Virginia authority did not help plaintiff. Similarly in a case where the depository
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Where a right to charge back is reserved but that right has

become permanently worthless by payings out from the account before
the depository bank has notice of equities, the bank becomes a holder
38
for value, whether it is agent or purchaser.

(2) Where a right to charge back is reserved and the depositor's

account remains ample or is replenished at any later time before suit so
that the right can be exercised effectively, the depository bank is not a

holder for value but must look to the account for reimbursement. And
if the account is only partly sufficient, the bank will be a holder for value
only for the excess, i.e., for the amount of the item less the maximum
balance it can appropriate. 39

(3) In situations like those in paragraph (2) it is possible that the
distinction between agent and purchaser takes on significance in North
Carolina and that the first in, first out rule4" will be applied in case of
a purchase so that the bank becomes a holder for value once and for all
when under that rule4 ' the full amount of the item in question has been
was a San Francisco bank and the garnishment was in Milwaukee, the Wisconsin
court after noting California law, found it to be "the majority rule" and the same
as that in Wisconsin. Blatz Brewing Co. v. Richardson & Richardson, Inc. 245
Wis. 567, 15 N.W2d 819 (1944).
" Past North Carolina cases seem to have held that the right to charge back
makes the bank an agent, Denton v. Shenandoah Milling Co., 205 N.C. 77, 170 S.E.
107 (1933), which doctrine would open the above statement to criticism in its
speaking of a purchaser who had such a right. But the present case, in finding the
bank a purchaser, does not find that the right to charge back was given up and
the writer does not believe the facts would warrant such a finding. So North
Carolina may now recognize, as does the United States Supreme Court, City of
Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 271 U.S. 489 (1926), such a combination as a purchaser with a right to charge back, paralleled in chattel transactions
by a purchase on condition with a right to return for credit.
" Cf. Lowrence Motor Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 238 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1957),
discussed in note 17, supra. The doctrine of United States Nat'l Bank v. McNair,
114 N.C. 335, 19 S.E. 361 (1894), that when a substantial amount has been paid
out the bank is a holder for value for the full amount is no longer supportable
under N.I.L. § 54, at least unless the view of Professor Beutel is adopted, that the
mere giving of bank credit or the giving of it with the privilege of drawing makes
the bank a holder for value. BRANNAx, NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAw 499 (7th
ed. 1948). That would go further than the "substantial amount" rule.
"An alternative rule would make the bank a holder for value to some extent
only when the depositor's balance fell below the amount of the item in suit and a
holder for full value only when and if the balance fell to zero. But this too would
defeat the full equitable effect of the charge back rule since it would disregard later
deposits once the account had been enough depleted. It is usually impossible to tell
from the cases what the state of accounts was after the crucial deposit. In MoonTraylor Co. v. Gray Smith Milling Co., 176 N.C. 407, 97 S.E. 213 (1918) the
depositor's account became heavily overdrawn a few days after the bank had
credited the item whose proceeds were attached by a creditor of the drawer but
the mistake was made of having an intermediary collecting bank assert ownership
rather than the depository which had gotten thus deeply involved.
" Some support for this once-for-all cut off date may be found in N.I.L. § 26,
G.S. § 25-31: "Where value has at any time been given for the instrument the
holder is deemed a holder for value in respect to all parties who became such prior
to that time." When read in connection with N.I.L. § 54, G.S. § 25-60, however, it
may be that the object of the section, which was taken from the British Bills of
Exchange Act, is in its final clause, indicating the parties whose rights are affected
by the giving of value.
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paid out 42 and subsequent replenishment of the account will not defeat
that status, once so obtained. It may be argued that the principal case
supports this position. If it does so, it repudiates in large measure the
strong equitable basis of the charge back rule, i.e., that to the extent that
a bank can avoid loss by merely debiting or appropriating a depositor's
balance it ought not be regarded as a holder for value and so prevail
against a maker or drawer with defenses.
(4) Where there is no right to charge back 43 the bank becomes a
holder for value under the first in, first out rule, i.e., after the previous
balance and perhaps any simultaneously deposited good funds are paid
out. This rule would apparently have no relation to an agent since
agency almost certainly implies the right to charge back.
M. S. B.
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Right to Counsel in Pre-Trial
Situations-When It Arises
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has been interpreted as requiring that
every defendant charged with a capital crime be represented by counsel. 1
How soon this right arises, however, is often an extremely difficult question. In Crooker v. California2 the United States Supreme Court in a
five-to-four decision held that due process was not violated when the
accused who requested counsel shortly after his arrest was denied it for
almost thirty hours during which time he made a confession which was
admitted in evidence at the trial where he was convicted of murder.
The Court stated that "due process does not always require immediate
honoring of a request to obtain one's own counsel in the hours after
arrest . . . . 3 Rather, the Court ruled that the accused is entitled to
," Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp.
790 (D. Mass. 1958) applied this rule without inquiry as to the later state of the
depositor's account in a case where the agency relationship was found. This decision, per Wyzanski, D.J., is the best reasoned of recent cases in this area, although
in applying Massachusetts law (and influenced by the Uniform Commercial Code,
then shortly to become effective in the Commonwealth) it properly ignored what
has become so important in North Carolina cases, the right to charge back.
" This was the situation in Franklin Nat!l Bank v. Roberts Bros. Co., 168 N.C.
473, 84 S.E. 706 (1915). This assumes an almost non-existent state of affairs today
with banks universally inserting stipulations in their dealings not only on deposit
slips but on advice forms, etc. Even if one of these forms was not used, as in case
of acknowledging receipt of an item by letter, there is the original signature card
and the continuous custom to fall back on to support the claimed right.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
'357 U.S. 433 (1958). The majority was composed of Frankfurter, Burton,
who since has retired, Clark, who wrote the opinion of the Court, Harlan, and
Whittaker, JJ. Douglas, J., with the concurrence of Warren, Ch. J., and Black
and Brennan, JJ., dissented.
3Id. at 441.
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counsel soon enough to get a fair trial,4 and circumstances in each case

determine just how soon that is. 5

The accused in the Crooker case sought to have the Court adopt the
more definite and liberal rule advocated by the dissent: "[T]he accused

who wants a counsel should have one at any time after the moment of

arrest." 6 Other courts have urged the application of such a rule.
Twenty-five years ago the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma in
Thurmond v. State7 stated that the accused has the right to counsel
"from the time he is arrested until the final disposition of the case."
Thirteen years later the same court reaffirmed this policy in Benton v.
States when it stated that the denial of right to counsel "upon arrest"
is "a violation of both the State and Federal constitutions." The
Supreme Court of Indiana eleven years ago in Suter v. State9 stated that
at 439-40.
'Id.
5
Ibid.U.S. at 448.
357
757 Okla. Crim. 388, 48 P.2d 845 (1935).
In this case the court reversed a
manslaughter conviction on the ground that the defendant had not been accorded
a fair and impartial trial because the prosecuting attorney had prejudiced the minds
of the jurors by comments such as, "An innocent man never needs a lawyer," referring to the fact that while detained at the police station the defendant refused to
make a statement but instead vainly "asked to see a lawyer and to communicate
with his family." The court said: "Under the Constitution and laws of this state,
the defendant is entitled to have an opportunity to consult with counsel at all stages
of the proceedings, from the time he is arrested until the final disposition of the
case . . . ." Id. at -, 48 P.2d at 856. (Emphasis added.) This was quoted with
Okla. Crim. - , 324 P.2d 548, 550 (1958).
approval in Wyatt v. Wolf, -

The court here reversed the murder
8 86 Okla. Crim. 173, 190 P.2d 168 (1948).
conviction of one who was arrested without charge and held for twenty days without the aid of counsel or the assistance of friends, although he had requested such

aid, and who, because of "inquisitorial grilling and ... fake demonstration of mob
violence designed to break down his physical resistance," made a confession upon
his conviction was predicated. The court said the denial of counsel itself
which
"requires
a reversal" because "injury resulted to the accused by reason of the
denial of the aid of counsel" and he did not waive that right. The court said:
"[T]he defendant was denied the right to counsel in all stages of the proceedings
from the date of his arrest . . . to . ..the date the charge of murder was filed
against him. Such denial constitutes a violation of both the State and Federal
constitutions.... This constitutional right to counsel clearly imports the right to
aid thereof upon arrest and during the inquisitorial proceedings when confession
was taken. It is not limited to aid of counsel at the time of the preliminary or the
, 190 P.2d at 177. (Emphasis added.)
trial." Id. at 227 Ind. 648, 88 N.E.2d 386 (1949). The court here found that the accused
"asked for his attorney . . .as soon as he was brought to headquarters," and the
attorney repeatedly requested permission to talk with the accused. For more than
two days these requests were denied, and the accused and his attorney were not
permitted to confer until after the confession had been made. The court found
that there was error in the admission of the confession, and it reversed the firstdegree burglary conviction and granted a new trial. The court quoted the state
constitutional provision giving the accused the right "to be heard by himself and
counsel," and cited cases holding that this right contemplates his right to consult
with counsel at "every stage of the proceedings." The court stated: "We think it
must be conceded that appellant had a right to have counsel when he was arrested,
particularly when he immediately requested it, and specified the counsel he desired
and apparently was prepared himself to pay for the services which he requested."
Id. at 658, 88 N.E.2d at 390. (Emphasis added.) The court added that refusal of
the police to grant this request and to arrange for the accused to confer confidentially with counsel was error which "must be charged to the state."
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the defendant "had a right to have counsel when he was arrested." In
each of these state cases the appellate court reversed a criminal conviction partly because the defendant had been denied timely access to
counsel. An even more liberal view was taken in Yung v. Coleman'0
when twenty-six years ago a federal court in Idaho stated that the right
to counsel arises when the accused is taken into custody even before
warrant for his arrest has been issued.
Although no cases were cited which had applied the rule advocated
in the dissenting opinion of the Crooker case, reference was made to
several state statutes" which provide that the accused should be permitted to confer with counsel upon his arrest. Among the statutes referred to is that of North Carolina, G.S. § 15-47, which provides:
Upon the arrest, detention, or deprivation of the liberties of any
person by an officer in this State, with or without warrant....

it shall be the duty of the officer making the arrest to permit the
person so arrested to communicate with counsel and friends immediately, and the right of such persons to communicate with
counsel and friends shall not be denied. (Emphasis added.)
Similar statutes of other states contain more qualifications concerning
the exercise of this privilege than are found in the North Carolina
statute.' 2 Only one other state statute refers to immediate communication with counsel and friends as a "right,"' 3 and the North Carolina
statute alone declares it to be a right which "shall not be denied." Yet,
despite this strong wording the North Carolina court has construed the
statute very narrowly. In State v. EximP4 the court upheld the actions
of a sheriff who refused to allow counsel employed by relatives and
friends of the defendant to confer with him until after a writ of habeas
0 5 F. Supp. 702 (D. Idaho 1934).
In that case three Chinese were held in
custody by a county sheriff although warrant for their arrest for first degree
murder had not been issued. Their attorney was permitted to talk with the accused
only when he consented to let a representative of the sheriff listen to the conversation. "This," the court said, "he did not have to concede, as the Constitution gave
to the petitioners the right to consult with their attorney alone." The court directed
the sheriff "to at once allow the petitioners the right to secure and talk alone with
their counsel . . . ." It further was stated that "it is within the intendments of
the 'due process of law' clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that one accused of
an offense shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel at all times." Id. at 703.
(Emphasis added.)
"1See footnote 4 of the dissenting opinion, 357 U.S. at 448. There cited are
statutes of California, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Ohio.
" Conferences during only "reasonable" hours: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.170
(1953) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 594:16 (1955).
Conferences only when the arrest is "without warrant or other process": Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 544.170 (1953).
"[E]xcept in cases of imminent danger of escape:" COL. REV. STAT. c. 39-1-1
(Supp. 1957) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 477 (1935) (not cited in dissenting opinion).
"If the person arrested is unable to offer sufficient bail or, if the offense charged
be a3 felony:" OHIo REv. CODE § 2935.14 (Supp. 1959).
' ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 449.1 (Supp. 1959).
'213 N.C. 16, 195 S.E. 7 (1938).
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corpus had been served on the sheriff. The court stated that G.S. § 1547 was not applicable because the defendant had not demanded of the
sheriff to be permitted to communicate with counsel. 15 This opinion
was reaffirmed in State v. Thompson'0 when the court found that "none
of the defendants made a request to be allowed to communicate with
relatives or friends or to obtain counsel."
In State v. Wheeler17 the North Carolina court recently handed down
an illuminating decision interpreting the nature of this right. The court
held that due process had been violated when three defendants jointly
charged with robbery were "imprisoned from the time of their arrest
until their trial" and were not allowed to communicate with each other.
The inquiry was "limited to a determination whether the petitioners
were denied the right to be represented by counsel, to have witnesses,
and a fair opportunity to prepare and to present their defense." In
referring to the first of these rights, the court said: "The rights of
communication go with the man into the jail ....,,18 From this language it would appear that the defendants' right to communicate with
counsel existed prior to incarceration and even "from the time of their
arrest."
The Court in the Crooker case recognized that the right to communicate with counsel exists under a California statute, but the majority held
that a violation of a state statutory right is not a violation of due process
per se even though there had been "perhaps a violation of California
law."' 19 In the Wheeler case, however, the North Carolina court appears
to refer to this right to communicate with counsel as a federal constitutional right and not merely a state statutory right. The court refers to
"rights of communication," which could be interpreted to mean communication with not only each other, but with counsel, friends, and
relatives as well.20 It refers to "such constitutional rights as are here
11It would seem reasonable to require that the officer inform the defendant that

counsel had requested to see him, thereby giving the defendant an opportunity to
request to see counsel.
16 224 N.C. 661, 32 S.E.2d 24 (1944).
17 249 N.C. 187, 105 S.E.2d 615 (1958).
Id. at 192, 105 S.E.2d at 620.
Penal Code,
15357 U.S. at 440. The Court here refers to § 825 of the California
which provides that after an arrest an attorney "may at the request of the prisoner
or any relative of such prisoner, visit the person so arrested." The majority interpreted the accused's argument as asking that it declare that "every state denial of
a request to contact counsel be an infringement of the constitutional right without
regard to the circumstances of the case." The Court said: "What due process
requires in one situation may not be required in another, and this, of course, be-

cause the least change of circumstances may provide or eliminate fundamental

fairness." This implies that fundamental fairness may still exist even though the
defendant's request to see counsel has not been granted immediately. Yet, the

judicial prophet might see significance in the Court's recognition last year of "the
deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law ..
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959).
20249 N.C. at 194, 105 S.E2d at 621. The statute refers to the right to communicate with only counsel and friends, but the court here suggests that the officer
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involved" and "their constitutional rights." The court states: "[W]e
are unable to join in the view that the petitioners' constitutional rights
have been afforded them."''1
This pluralization of the term "right"
plus the emphasis placed upon the right to communicate with counsel
leads to the conclusion that this right is intended to be included among
the constitutional rights referred to. Further, the court added that "due
process of law implies the right and opportunity to be heard and to pre'22
pare for the hearing.
Accordingly, in view of the strongly-worded North Carolina statute,
the intimations of the North Carolina court in the Wheeler case, the longstanding decisions of courts in three other states, and the strong minority
on the United States Supreme Court, it is submitted that the officer of
the law in North Carolina would be wise to adhere strictly to both the
letter and the spirit of this state's statute, and that any person who is
accused of crime and who desires to contact counsel, friends, or relatives
should be permitted to do so promptly and as soon as reasonably possible. To do otherwise might well be held in violation of a state constitutional 23 and statutory right as well as a denial of the federal guarantee
24
of due process.
RAYMOND

M.

TAYLOR

Constitutional Law-Obscenity Statute-Proof of Scienter
In Smith v. California' the defendant bookseller had been convicted
under a Los Angeles city ordinance which made it unlawful "for any
person to have in his possession any obscene or indecent writing, or
'2
book ... in any place where ... books . . . are sold or kept for sale.
Thus scienter was not an element of the crime. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the ordinance was
unconstitutional as a violation of the first amendment right of freedom
of the press.3 The Court reasoned that under the Constitution knowledge
of the obscene contents was necessary for conviction of a crime involving
has the duty to make a "reasonable effort" on behalf of the defendant to contact
his relatives. If one were to consider a relative as not necessarily either counsel
or friend, the court could be interpreted as extending the accused's right in this
respect. Therefore, one arrested logically could contact a minimum of three persons: (1) counsel, and (2) friend, both as provided in the statute, and (3) relative,
as covered by the courts suggestion. The use of the plural term "friends" and
"relatives" perhaps could authorize communication with more than one representative2 1from each of these classes.
1Id. at 194, 105 S.E.2d at 621.
2
Id. at 193, 105 S.E.2d at 621. (Emphasis added.)
N.C. CoNsT. art 1, §§ 11, 17.
24 Also, the North Carolina statute contains this provision: "Any officer who
shall violate the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
be fined or imprisoned, or both, in the discretion of the court."

'361 U.S. 147 (1959).
' Los

ANGELEs, CAL.,

MUNICIPAL CoDE

'U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.

§ 41.01.1.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
possession of obscene literature because of the preferred status of constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and speech. 4 Further, the
Court stated that such an ordinance would force a bookseller to restrict
the books he sells to those he has inspected, and this burden of selfimposed prior restraint would restrict constitutionally protected literature as well as obscene literature.5
The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan, 6 refused to pass
on the question of what constitutes scienter saying only:
We might observe that it has been some time now since the law
viewed itself as impotent to explore the actual state of a man's
mind .

. .

. Eyewitness testimony of a bookseller's perusal of a

book hardly need be a necessary element in proving awareness of
its contents. The circumstances may warrant the inference that
he was aware of what a book contained, despite his denial.7
It is settled that the sale of obscene literature is not protected by the
first amendment.8 The principal case, however, establishes that the
possessor of obscene literature is protected to the extent that he cannot be convicted by a state of a crime involving obscene literature unless
knowledge of the obscenity is a requisite of the crime. 9 The questions
of the type and quantity of evidence necessary to prove such knowledge
remain for future interpretation.'0 There are four cases that deal directly
with these problems.'1
In State v. Miller,1 2 a case involving obscene pictures, the West Vir'Strict liability may be imposed by public welfare laws such as anti-narcotic
or pure food laws. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1914) ; United States v.
Sprague, 208 Fed. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1913). However, such cases as these are distinguishable because first amendment freedoms are not involved.
' This decision seems sound. "It is not the book that is on trial; it is a person.
The conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or
picture." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (concurring opinion).
' There were three concurring opinions. Justice Black concurred in the result
reasoning that any obscenity statute will restrict freedom of the press. 361 U.S. at
155-60. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result, but questioned what would
be needed to prove scienter. Id. at 160-67. Justice Douglas concurred in the result
on the ground that freedom of expression can be suppressed only when that expression "is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be a part of it." Id. at 168.
Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part. He would not have
reached the scienter question but would have reversed on the ground that the trial
judge excluded all evidence as to "contemporary community standards" with regard
to the
7 test of obscenity. Id. at 169-72.
Id. at 154.
' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
' The first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press are made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
"0The Court recognized the problem. Justice Frankfurter said, "A bookseller
may ... be well aware of the nature of a book . . . without having opened its
cover, or, in any true sense, having knowledge of the book." 361 U.S. at 164.
"'-United States v. Hochman, 175 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Wis. 1959); People v.
Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947); People v. Schenkman, 195
N.Y.S.2d 570 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1960) ; State v. Miller, 112 S.E.2d 472 (W. Va.

iai12 S.E.2d 472 (W. Va. 1960).
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ginia Supreme Court distinguished Smith v. California on the facts,
saying, "Certainly anyone who distributes such pictures would know
what he is distributing and the element of scienter is not necessary in
such a case."' Is Further the court held that knowledge of the character
of the obscene pictures would be presumed and "the defendant may, by
proper evidence, excuse or justify"'14 the distribution of such pictures.
In People v. Schenkman,15 the only other reported case interpreting
Smith v. California, four booksellers and a bookstore owner were prosecuted for illegal sale of obscene literature. The court discussed the
sufficiency of the evidence relating to scienter. Though there was no
direct evidence of knowledge on the part of the defendants, the court
found as a fact that they had knowledge of the contents of the books
relying on the following evidence: (1) Each of the four books found to
be obscene was a paperback book priced at five dollars. (2) The titles
of the books were "Queen Bee, ....
Succulent," "Garden of Evil," and
"Bloomer Boy." (3) On the back of one of the books was the statement,
"The kind of book you always wished could be published. Nothing is
hidden .... A tale that is wider and more sizzling than a barrel of sly
French novels. A Roman orgy is tame compared to some of the bedroom scenes."'16 The admission of such evidence and its sufficiency
would seem to be in line with past decisions concerning obscenity statutes
where scienter was a part of the definition of the crime.
In United States v. Hochnan'7 the defendant was charged with
knowingly taking from a common carrier copies of obscene publications
transported in interstate commerce.' 8 The district court held that there
was sufficient evidence to justify the jury's finding of scienter in that
the obscene books were paperback books selling for three dollars, the
titles and illustrations were suggestive, 19 the defendant was a college
graduate experienced in the book business, 20 and had personally selected
21
the books from the shelves of a wholesaler.
Il Id. at 478.
'"Ibid.

N.Y.S.2d 570 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1960).
"6The conversations between the defendants and the arresting officers were also
admitted as evidence. One defendant had said that he sold the books to anyone who
wanted to buy them. Another said that he did not think the books were so bad.
Still another read to the officer from a medical work dealing with sex and stated
that the questioned books were not as bad. The fourth said he knew the books
were in the store for sale. The fifth is not reported as having said anything. Id.
at 572-73.
" 175 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
"8In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1958).
19 The titles and illustrations, said the court, "are such as to put an intelligent
person on notice of the type of books which they were." 175 F. Supp. at 882.
20 It was not admitted in evidence nor mentioned in the opinion that the defendant had been convicted two years earlier of selling obscene material in violation
of a state statute. State v. Hochman, 2 Wis. 2d 410, 86 N.W.2d 446 (1957).
"The court said, "The jury could aelieve that he at least thumbed through the
15195

books.'

175 F. Supp. at 882.

1960]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

In a 1947 California case, People v. Wepplo,22 the state statute
required that the seller know the character of the obscene work.23 The
book in question bore "no marks or indications of its character on the
outside, nor was its title enlightening or even suggestive on the subject."' 24 In the absence of other evidence of knowledge, defendant's conviction was reversed.
These four cases seem to raise several problems in regard to proof
of scienter. The courts emphasized the fact that the books involved
were paperbacks selling for from three to five dollars. The New York
court in People v. Schenkman stated, "When, therefore, a paper covered
book is sold by a book seller for $5.00, can it be truthfully said that he
did not know that the sale was induced by the fact that the book contained hard core pornography ... ?"25 But it is evident that paperback
books could be priced at five dollars because of their legitimate content
rather than their pornographic content. Further, the outside of a book
could be highly suggestive because of the title and statements on the
cover, while in fact the contents could be completely innocent. Such a
book would not be obscene because the whole work must be obscene
before the book may be classed as obscenity. 26 Finally, a bookseller
could be well educated and highly experienced in the book business,
and yet, because of the number of books handled in his establishment
have no knowledge of the contents of a particular book.
Thus far the North Carolina Supreme Court has not dealt with the
problems concerning the type and quantity of evidence necessary to prove
guilty knowledge in obscenity cases. However, in 1957 the North
Carolina legislature adopted the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code provisions relating to obscenity.27 This statute contains a provision that possession of obscene matter raises a presumption that the
seller knows the contents.2 8 This provision would seem to be clearly
29
opposed to the spirit and letter of the decision in Smith v. California.
The state could introduce in evidence the obscene work, establish the
fact that the defendant had possessed it, and this with the aid of the
'278 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947).
2" CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.
21178 P.2d at 858.
23
2 195 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
27 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (Tent. draft No. 6, 1957) was incorporated as
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1 (Supp. 1959).

189 (1958).

See generally Note, 36 N.C.L. Rv.

possesses, or procures obscenity is
2" "A person, firm, or corporation who . ..
presumed to know th~e existence of its parts, features or contents of the material
which
render it obscene." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1(f) (Supp. 1959).
2
' In State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387 (Ohio 1960), the Ohio Supreme Court, by
a four-to-three majority, held that a statute making knowing possession of obscene
literature, with or without intent to sell, a crime was opposed to the general principles of Smith v. California in that such a blanket restriction would keep persons
from reading many books for fear they might be obscene. Because of a provision
of the Ohio Constitution, the statute was allowed to stand.
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presumption would support a conviction if the defendant failed to rebut
it. In this manner the defendant would be convicted without actual
proof of scienter. Further this provision is in conflict with the Supreme
Court's holding in Speiser v. Randall30 which prohibits a state from
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant when the crime charged
involves a limitation placed upon freedom of speech. The analogy would
seem clearly to be that the burden could not be shifted to the defendant
when the statute involved a limitation placed upon freedom of the press.
It is submitted that the legislature should reconsider this apparently unconstitutional provision.
CHARLES E. DAMERON III
Estate and Gift Taxation-Discretionary TrustGrantor As Life Beneficiary
A useful and not uncommon trust arrangement is one that gives the
trustee absolute discretion to pay income to the grantor or to accumulate
it for the remaindermen. For additional flexibility a controllable power
to invade principal is often lodged in the trustee to insure that the grantor
will not be financially embarrassed should an unforeseen emergency arise.
This Comment is concerned primarily with the federal estate tax consequences of such a trust although the basic gift tax consequences are
developed as a corollary. Although it appears that the tax law affecting
such trusts has not been definitively developed, trends in some areas seem
clearly discernible. On the other hand, to the writer's surprise, many
pertinent areas seem never to have been considered by the authorities.
For purposes of this Comment an inter vivos trust of the following
basic outline will be assumed: the independent trustee has absolute discretion to pay income to the grantor for life or to accumulate; the trustee,
pursuant to ascertainable external standards,' is empowered to invade
principal for the grantor's benefit; the grantor has no other interests in
or power over the trust; the remaindermen must survive the grantor;
the trust is governed by North Carolina law.
The problem is whether the interests reserved by the grantor will
cause inclusion of the corpus in his gross estate by virtue of the incomplete inter vivos transfer sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
chiefly sections 2036(a) (1) and 2037. Also to be considered are the
steps that the grantor of such a trust might take to rid himself of the
tax-risky interests.
8

1

357 U.S. 513 (1958).

E.g., "support, maintenance, and educational needs." It has been held that a
state court determination of what is or is not an ascertainable standard is not
binding in federal tax cases. Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanagh, 137 F. Supp. 52
(E.D. Mich. 1955). Contra, LOWNDES &KRaim, FEmDEAL EsTATE & Girt TAXES
198 (1956), declaring that it is a matter of local law.
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INCLUSION UNDER SECTION 2036(a) (1)-THE INCOME ELEMENT
Tax Law
Does the discretion conferred upon the trustee by the grantor to pay
the income to the grantor for life fall within the purview of section
2036(a) (1) ?2 There seems to be only one appellate court case on this
point, In re Estate of Uhl.3 There the decedent grantor had created a
trust reserving the right to one hundred dollars a month of the income
of the trust and it was conceded that the amount of the corpus necessary
to produce this amount was includible in his gross estate. In addition,
however, the trust provided: "[T]hat the trustee may in his discreI.

tion . . . pay a greater sum than One hundred dollars ($100.00) per
month if it shall seem advisable . . . ." Such excess could be paid only

out of income. The Commissioner contended that this amounted to a
right to all the income from the entire corpus and accordingly sought
to include the entire corpus in the gross estate. The propriety of this
determination was the sole issue in the case. The Tax Court4 had held
that the entire corpus was includible on the grounds that the decedent's
creditors could have reached the full amount of the trust income and that
the decedent could have obtained the enjoyment and economic benefit
of the full income by the simple expedient of borrowing money and
relegating the creditor to reimbursement from the trust. The Tax Court,
however, so held without the benefit of any local (Indiana) law to the
effect that creditors could reach the entire income where there was a
vested remainder in third persons. The Court of Appeals reversed. It
admitted that there were no cases in point under the federal estate tax
law, but it considered the gift and estate tax laws in pari ntateria,at least
on this matter, and looked to three gift tax cases for precedent: Herzog
v. Commissioner,5 Rheinstrom v. Commissioner,6 and Ben F. Hazelton,
Jr.7 In those cases the courts held that where income could be paid the
grantor in the absolute discretion of the trustee, the donor retained no
right to it and thus a completed gift was made. Accepting the conclusion
that the grantor had no direct right to this discretionary income, the
court in the Uhl case concluded that the corpus would not be includible
I "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property .

.

. to

the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a

transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration
in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained
for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or
for any period which does not in fact end before his death(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property .... ." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2036 (a) (1). All references hereinafter to
code sections are to the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
8241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957).
'Edgar M. Uhl, 25 T.C. 22 (1955).
'116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941).
0105 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1939).

T40 B.T.A. Memo 660 (1940).
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in the gross estate. The Tax Court had not relied on the grantor's right
to the income, however, but had based its decision on the right of decedent's creditors to obtain the full income. The Court of Appeals held
that the Tax Court erred in construing Indiana law and reversed, 8
concluding that the remainder of the corpus in excess of the amount
necessary to produce one hundred dollars a month, being beyond decedent's control and subject to the trustee's uncontrolled discretion to
divert income from it, passed to the remaindermen and accordingly was
not includible in the grantor's estate.
The Tax Court in the Uhl case relied primarily on the case of Alice
Spaulding Paolozzi.9 There the grantor created a trust whereby the
trustees in their absolute discretion were to pay her the net income of
the trust. The Massachusetts law which governed enabled creditors of
a settlor-beneficiary of a discretionary trust to reach the maximum
amount which the trustee could pay the beneficiary. The court reasoned
that the grantor could obtain the enjoyment and economic benefit of the
full income by incurring debts and relegating the creditors to reimbursement from the trust. Therefore the court held that the grantor had made
a taxable gift of only the remainder of the corpus and that the full value
of the life estate of a person of grantor's age should be deducted from
the value of the trust.
A related case not mentioned by the Court of Appeals in Uhl is
Carolyn Peck Boardman.10 There decedent created a trust whereby
the trustees for the life of the grantor could distribute income and principal to her "as the Trustees deem necessary for her comfort, support
and/or happiness." Practically all of the income was distributed to the
grantor, and there were several distributions of principal. The Tax
Court held the whole corpus includible in the decendent-grantor's gross
estate. It said that the grantor intended that no one other than herself
have the income so long as she lived. Moreover, the court concluded
that the word "happiness" was so broad that the trustees could not have
resisted her demand for the income. The inclusion was based on the
predecessor of section 2036. It will be noted that the trust instrument
provided a standard on which the trustee was to exercise his discre'The Court of Appeals did not repudiate the theory of the Tax Court, but, there
being no Indiana case in point, it refused to find Indiana law against the taxpayer.
The court in referring to the Tax Court's theory regarding creditor's rights did
make one remark, which, with due respect to the court, seems questionable. It
said, "Of course, such a right, if it existed, was the right of the creditors, not that
of the grantor." 241 F.2d at 870. Obviously, this is true, but this right in the
creditor directly gives the grantor full power and economic control over the income
of the trust. As was said in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930), "[Tlaxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with the actual
command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is paid."
923 T.C. 182 (1954).
1020 T.C. 871 (1953).
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tion-namely, the comfort, support and/or happiness of the grantorwhich the grantor could enforce in equity.
Since the estate tax law on this point is evidently in pari materia with
the gift tax law, review of the gift tax cases in this area is necessary.
The Paolozzi case has already been discussed.
In Rheinstrom v. Commissioner" the question material was whether
there was a gift of income which independent trustees could in their
absolute discretion accumulate or pay over to the grantor for life. It
was held that the grantor had retained no interest or control over the
fund and thus a taxable gift was made. Creditors' rights were not
mentioned.
Herzog v. Commissioner'2 considered the question more thoroughly.
There the independent trustee could pay income in his absolute discretion to either the grantor or his wife. The question was whether a gift
tax was due and owing on the entire corpus or only on the value of the
remainder. It was held that the grantor had retained no right to income, but had only a possibility that the trustee would allocate to him.
The court doubted that the grantor or his creditors could, under New
York law, reach any interest in the trust other than what the trustees
in their absolute discretion elected to pay to the grantor, and the case
was decided accordingly. Moreover, the court expressed doubt that an
estate tax would be imposed on the grantor of this trust, saying that the
grantor retained no right to income. Of course, the court admitted that
the mere fact of gift tax liability does not preclude estate tax liability also.
Ben F. Hazelton, Jr.13 involved a trust whereby an advisory committee might in its absolute discretion direct the trustee to pay to the
grantor income for his "suitable comfort and support and . . .general
welfare . . . ." A gift tax deficiency was determined on the ground

that the grantor had no right to the income. No mention was made of
the possibility of the grantor's creditors reaching the entire income.
The most recent gift tax case on this matter is Commissioner v.
Vander Weele.14 Under the terms of a trust created by a young wife
the independent trustees were to pay to the grantor for her life "such
reasonable and substantial portion of the entire net annual income of
the entire trust estate as to the Trustees in their sole judgment and
discretion shall deem desirable and ample for the comfortable well-being
and enjoyment of the Donor . .

."

Moreover, the trustees in their sole

judgment and discretion could invade principal and accumulate income
to provide for the "comfortable well-being" of the grantor to the extent
that they deemed "advisable." The Tax Court 15 held that no taxable
"1105
F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1939).
12116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941).
"40
Memo
1,254B.T.A.
F.2d 895
(6th660
Cir.(1940).
1958).
"

Sarah Gilkey Vander Weele, 27 T.C. 340 (1956).
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gift was made, relying exclusively on the Paolozzi case as to the income
part of the trust.16 The Court of Appeals affirmed. It was settled under
Michigan law, the controlling local law, that creditors of the beneficiary
could reach all the income that the trustees could distribute to her, as
well as principal if, as in this case, the trustee had power to distribute it.
This, under the Paolozzi doctrine, would give the grantor the full economic benefit of the trust. Moreover, stress was laid on the understanding of the grantor and the trustees that the trust would be liberally
construed to keep the grantor in funds for her accustomed standard of
living. The court said that the Herzog and Uhl cases were "clearly
distinguishable." It would seem that the only satisfactory distinction
between Vander Weele and the Herzog and Uhl cases is the established
right of creditors to reach the entire income under local law. The right
clearly existed in Vander Weele's jurisdiction and was relied upon,
whereas the courts in Herzog and Uhl doubted the existence of that right
and decided accordingly. In Vander Weele the court stated in dictum
that this trust "would have the tendency to preserve the property transferred in trust for estate-tax taxation."'1
To summarize,is it appears that while thoroughly definitive cases
directly concerning estate tax consequences are lacking, it would seem
safe to assume that the gift tax law is in harmony' 9 with the estate tax
law in this area, so that with the gift tax cases, a few principles may be
established. First, a pure discretionary trust, nothing else appearing,
is a complete gift, Herzog, Rheinstrom, and Hazelton,20 and will not
cause inclusion in gross estate, Uhl. Second, if the grantor can demand
all of the income, the corpus will be cast into gross estate, Boardman.
Third, if under local law the creditors of the grantor can reach all the
income, no taxable gift is made except of the remainder, Paolozzi and
" On the authority of Christiana K. Gramm, 17 T.C. 1063 (1951), the Tax
Court held that such a broad invasion possibility resulted in no gift of the remainder.
17254 F.2d at 898.
2 A helpful article is Covey, Power to Distribute to Grantor, 98 TRUSTS &
E
EsTATxs 322 (1959). There the author discussess the cases herein discussed. He
concludes that the key to tax consequences of absolute discretionary trusts for the
grantor is the right of creditors under local law to reach the entire income. It is
on this ground alone that he explains the different results in the recent cases of
Ul and Vander Weele. Concern is expressed over the evident tendency of the
courts, as, for instance, in Vander Weele, to look at the extrinsic facts in determining the tax consequences in this area. Obviously this presents difficulties to
the estate planner in that how facts might be subsequently construed by a court is
impossible to predict. However, the author concludes that the cases furnish a
consistent test-namely, whether or not creditors can reach the funds.
" On this point it seems that the same transfer concept is being developed by
the courts so that properly laid gift or estate taxes will be mutually exclusive of
one another. Covey, supra note 18, at 326. However, this principle seems inapplicable in regard to §§ 2037 and 2038. See discussion in notes 47 and 71 infra.
" See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958) which seems to be in accord. All
references hereafter to regulation sections are to the current regulations under the
1954 Internal Revenue Code.
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Vander Weele, and by implication corpus will be includible in gross
estate, Vander Weel and Uhl (Tax Court version).21 Fourth, it seems
that, if in fact the grantor intended to get all the income, inclusion in
gross estate may occur. Boardman and Vander Weele. Thus tax consequences turn on factors depending in large degree upon the governing
trust law in the local judisdiction.
Trust Law
There seems to be no North Carolina case involving a discretionary
trust where the grantor is the sole life beneficiary. In the case of Carter
v. Young 22 testator's testamentary trust directed semi-annual payments
to "my ... wife for the use (in such proportions and in such manner as
she herself may decide) of herself and of my grandson . . . ." After
making a few small allotments to the grandchild the wife ceased and
declared that she did not intend to make further apportionments. Suit
was brought on behalf of the minor grandchild alleging his need and the
wife's abuse of discretion. The court held that the wife's refusal to
exercise the dicretionary power was a breach of trust, defeating the
intent of the settlor and damaging the grandson. If thereafter she failed
to exercise her discretion fairly and equitably the court indicated that
it would do so. Just how broadly the court will hereafter apply the
Carter case remains to be seen. But the import of it seems to be that
unless the settlor has expressly authorized his trustee to pay nothing,
the beneficiary has a cause of action in equity based on abuse of discretion if the trustee wholly withholds distribution of income. There seems
to be no reason why this right would not be extended to the settlorbeneficiary. Note that the settlor in Carter had not used terms such as
"uncontrolled" or "absolute" in describing the trustee's discretion. Consequently the court construed the trust as one discretionary only as to
when and in what "reasonable" amounts distribution should be made.
The trust herein considered, being absolutely discretionary, of a different
sort.
There seems to be no North Carolina case dealing with the rights of
a settlor's creditors23 against a discretionary trust for his benefit.2 4 In
' Reversed on other grounds by the Court of Appeals.
2-193 N.C. 678, 137 S.E. 875 (1927). Compare
Woodard v. Mordecai, 234
N.C. 463, 67 S.E.2d 639 (1951), where the refusal of a trustee in good faith to
invade principal as he had discretion to do was held not to be an abuse of discretion.

' After exhaustion of such interests of the judgment debtor as are subject to
execution, a remedy against his equitable interests is provided by N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 1-352 to -368 (1953). No provision, however, expressly reates to the rights of
aAscreditor
against
discretionary
trust
created
by thebydebtor
for his own
benefit.
to whether
the acreditor's
bill has
been
supplanted
the statutory
remedy,
see
a'Cf.
Union
Heath, 187 N.C. 54, 121 S.E. 24 (1924), holding that
Note,
35 Bank
N.C.L.ofRxv.
414v.(1957).

creditors could reach the whole interest of beneficiaries of a testamentary trust
where the trustees had discretion to postpone payment of principal, at least where
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Pilkington v. West,25 involving a non-discretionary trust, the settlor-life

beneficiary had provided that the trustee should hold for her sole use
and benefit "wholly free from intereference, debts and liabilities ...."
The Supreme Court said: "[O]ne cannot remove his property from
liability for his debts or restrict his right of alienation by a conveyance
to a trustee for the sole use and benefit of the owner, grantor." 2 The
reference to creditors must be regarded as dictum since no creditor was
claiming rights in the property. One may question whether these terms
purport to restrain alienation, but if the court so construed them the
statement is a holding since the right to alienate was the issue in the
case. Among others, the court cited as authority for the above quotation
Scott on Trusts,2 7 which points out that even where spendthrift trusts

are valid one in favor of the grantor is ineffectual, and the grantor can
assign his interest in the income and principal and his creditors can
reach it. It is against public policy to permit the owner of property to
create for his own benefit an interest in that property which cannot be
reached by his creditors.
Scott also deals with discretionary trusts for the settlor, 28 stating
the rule to be that where the settlor creates a discretionary trust of which
he is himself a beneficiary, his creditors can reach his interest, even
though the trustee in the exercise of his discretion chooses to pay nothing.
Scott is supported by the weight of authority. 29 The Restatement of
Trusts (Second), section 156(2) provides: "Where a person creates
for his own benefit a trust for support or a discretionary trust, his transferee or creditors can reach the maximum amount which the trustee
under the terms of the trust could pay to him or apply for his benefit."
However, in Herzog v. Commissioner0 the court refused to follow the
Restatement, there being no controlling New York case, because the
grantor was not the sole beneficiary, a factor which in Greenwich Trust
Co. v. Tyson 3' was held not to alter the result. Also, it will be noted
that the Court of Appeals in Uhl did not hold that the creditors could
not reach the income, but relied on the absence of Indiana authority to
the effect that they could.
there is no gift over. This is in accord with the general rule. II ScoT, TRUSTS
§ 155 (2d ed. 1956).
25246 N.C. 575, 99 S.E.2d 798 (1957).
20Id. at 580, 99 S.E.2d at 802.
7 I Scorr, TRUSTS § 156 (2d ed. 1956).
sII id. § 156.2.
2"E.g., Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211, 27 A.2d 166 (1942);
Ware v. Gulda, 331 Mass. 68, 117 N.E.2d 137 (1954) ; Petty v. Moores Brook
Sanatarium, 110 Va. 815, 67 S.E. 355 (1910) ; see P-H WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES

13735;

GRISWoLD, SPENDmR

TRUST: § 481 (1947).

But see Herzog v. Com-

missioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941), which involved alternative beneficiaries,
and In re Uhl's Estate, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957), wherein the court refused
to find local law in accord with the general rule.
20116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941).
21 129 Conn. 211, 27 A.2d 166 (1942).
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In the instant problem it is most difficult to determine what the tax
consequences are as long as the state rule is not settled. As was noted
earlier, the federal courts in Uhl and Herzog refused to hold against
the taxpayer when the tax consequences depended on local law and the
particular jurisdiction had not ruled on the crucial point. It would be
a gamble in the instant problem to assume that such favorable treatment
would ensue in tax litigation over such a trust in North Carolina. Federal courts are often put in the position of deciding a state law question
that has not been ruled upon by the state courts. In such event the
federal court adopts the rule which it believes, using all available indicia,
the state court would adopt.32 Considering the policy behind the general
rule, together with the dictum in Pilkington, it is hard to imagine that
a federal court3 3 would not conclude that the North Carolina law is in
34
accord with the general rule.
II. INCLUSION UNDER SECTION

2037-THE INVASION POSSIBILITY

Recall that in the inter vivos trust under consideration the trustee
pursuant to ascertainable standards is empowered to invade principal for
the grantor. Will this cause inclusion in the grantor's estate under section 2037? Of course, if inclusion of the corpus is caused by one code
section the applicability of another is, as a practical matter, immaterial.
However, section 203735 should be considered here for at least two reasons: first, a court considering the matters might not hold in accord
with the conclusion reached above in regard to the income element; and
second, should the grantor successfully dispose of the income element,
the invasion element would then be the Commissioner's only ground for
36
levying an estate tax.
2
MOoRE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE Il0.307[2] (2d ed. 1959).
"The obligation [of a federal court] to accept local law extends not merely to
definitive decisions, but to considered dicta as well, and if explicit pronouncements
are wanting, the federal court should endeavor to discover the law of the state on
the point at issue by considering related decisions, analogies, and any reliable data

tending convincingly to show what the state rules is." Id. at p. 3312.
"'"Where the applicable state law will directly determine tax liability there is
a distinct burden on the proponent to satisfy the court that the state law, as construed in connection with the terms of any instrument of transfer involved, does
in fact support his thesis." 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL GnFr & Es'AT TAXATION § 10.04
at 610 (1959) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
" Section 2037(a) provides: "The value of gross estate shall include the value
of all property . .. to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has . . . made a transfer . .. by trust or otherwise, if (1) possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership of such
interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the property (but in
the case of a transfer made before October 8, 1949, only if such reversionary interest
arose by the express terms of the instrument of transfer), and the value of such

reversionary interest immediately before the death of the decedent exceeds 5 per

cent of the value of such property."
"0Consideration herein of § 2038 is not deemed necessary. Even if a right to
compel invasion constitutes a power to terminate, revoke or alter within the meaning of § 2038, it appears that the same right is a § 2037 reversionary interest. 3
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The trust being considered herein requires that the remaindermen
survive the grantor. The first question is, therefore, whether the power
of invasion subject to "fixed," "external" standards37 lodged in the trustee
amounts to a reversionary interest within the meaning of section 2037.
The cases hold that it does.
The leading case on the point seems to be Blunt v. Kelly.8" The
trust instrument provided: "Should in their opinion the necessity arise,
the Trustees are hereby empowered to use such portion of the principal
of the trust fund as may seem proper for the support, care or benefit
of . . . [the grantor]." The question was whether the corpus was includible in the grantor's gross estate under the forerunner of the present
section 2037. The court held that the trustees were not free to make an
uncontrolled decision regarding invasion, but were bound to exercise
their discretion in good faith pursuant to the standards specified and
were subject to control of a court of equity if they failed to do so.
Accordingly the court concluded that since the necessity of invasion
might arise so long as the grantor lived the transfer was intended to take
effect in enjoyment after death and was thus includible.
In Commissioner v. Irving Trust Co.89 the trustee was empowered
"in its absolute discretion" and "as it deems advisable" to invade for'
the grantor the corpus in excess of an amount necessary to produce a
specified income for life tenants. The court held that under the trust
MaERmNs §§ 25.33, 2528 to .30. Thus as the five per cent limitation is met, the whole

corpus is cast into gross estate, and if the reversionary interest is valued at less
than five per cent § 2033 will require inclusion of that amount anyway. LOWNDES
& KRAMER, Fr.A
ESTATE & G='T TAXES 118 (1956). Section 2038, on the other
hand, does not require inclusion of a power subject to a contingency beyond the
decedent's control and which has not occurred before his death. 3 MERTENS § 25.11.
Thus it would seem that if the grantor at his death were not in position to enforce
invasion because of circumstances beyond his control, there would be no right to
revoke. See Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Cyrus C. Yawkey,

12 T.C. 1164 (1949); Daisy Christine Patterson, 36 B.T.A. 407 (1936), petition,
to review dismissed sub norn. Helvering v. Patterson, 99 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1938).
Though perhaps rare, the situation could arise where under the circumstances there
existed at decedent's death a present right in equity to compel invasion for a nominal amount, less than five per cent of the value of the transferred property. Would
§ 2038 cause inclusion only of the amount subject to recall, or would it cause inclusion of the whole remainder out of which this amount would be taken? There
seems to be no case on this situation but 3 MERTENS §§ 25.44, .46, seems to indicate
that the whole interest which is affected by the power to compel invasion is includible in gross estate.
" Presently, the rule seems to be that if there are no such standards, an independent trustee having, rather, absolute discretion to invade principal, there is
nothing retained by the grantor and thus there will be no inclusion under either
§ 2037 or § 2038. See 3 MERTENS §§ 23.33, 25.29, .30. It does not appear, however,
that the courts have considered the right of the grantor's creditors to each principal
in connection with these two code provisions. See Ware v. Gulda, 331 Mass. 68, 117
N.E.2d 137 (1954). The rationale of the Tax Court in Paolorzi and Uhl would
seem equally applicable in arriving at the conclusion that the grantor had retained,
in effect, a power to revoke or terminate the entire trust. See Covey, Power to
Distribute to Grantor, 98 TRusTs & ESTATES 322, 326 (1959).
28131 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1942).
147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945).
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involved the trustee was vested with a pure discretion which the grantor
could not cause to be exercised in his favor. The court said:
In a case where the return of any part of the corpus will depend
solely upon the discretion of the trustee the true test as to its inclusion in the taxable estate of the settlor is whether the trustee
is free to exercise his untrammelled discretion, or whether the
exercise of his discretion is governed by some external standard
which a court may apply in compelling compliance with the conditions of the trust instrument. If the former, the40 corpus is not
subject to taxation as a part of the settlor's estate.
Also in point is Toeller's Estate v. Commissioner.41 The clause
which caused the litigation provided: "Should misfortune or sickness
cause the expenses of Trustor to increase, so that in the judgment of
the Trustee the net income so payable to Trustor is not sufficient to
meet the living expenses of Trustor, then ...said Trustee is authorized
to pay . . . such portions of the principal of said Trust Estate as may
be necessary under the circumstances." It was held that the words
provided a fixed standard for ascertaining when invasion would be
necessary. This created an enforceable fiduciary obligation which the
trustee had no arbitrary right to ignore. Therefore since the settlor
retained the conditional right to repayment of part or all of the corpus
independent of the will of the trustees, the court sustained the Tax
Court's inclusion of the corpus under the forerunner of section 2037.
Also in this case the taxpayer argued that even if an interest in the
corpus was retained, only the reasonable value of this interest should
be included. To this the court replied: "The important point is that the
possibility was present, by reason of the language employed by the
trustor, and no limit was imposed on the extent to which the corpus
could be applied, beyond the setting up of the standards which should
42
invoke the application."
The Five Per Cent Limitation
Since the five per cent limitation has been introduced into section
2037 by the Technical Changes Act of 1949,4 3 the crucial question is
whether the right to invade through the enforcement of the fiduciary's
discretion gives decedent an interest equal to five per cent of the value
44
of the transferred property as of the date of death.

"'Id. at 949. But see discussion of creditors' rights against principal in note 37
supra.
1165 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1948).
12 Id. at 667.
4863 Stat. 891 (1949).
"In LowNDES & KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE & GiFr TAXES (1956) the authors
remark at page 116, n.28: "It would seem that under Section 2037 the value of the
settlor's reversionary interest [referring to a right of grantor to compel invasion
of principal subject to an external standard] would seldom exceed 5 per cent of
the value of the transferred property (if it is capable of valuation at all) so that
nothing would now be taxable to the settlor's estate under Section 2037."
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The regulations declare that actuarial principles may be used if
applicable, but where the interest is not susceptible to actuarial valuation, then fair market value is used. It seems safe to conclude that the
right of invasion in the instant trust is not capable of being calculated
actuarially. There seems to be no case under section 2037 since 1949
which has considered valuation of a right to enforce invasion pursuant
to a fixed standard. Therefore analogous situations will have to be
considered.
It would appear that because of the five per cent rule the probability
of invasion would have to be estimated. There have been cases where
for purposes of computing gift taxes and charitable deductions the courts
have been required to determine valuation as affected by a power of
invasion. McHugh v. United States46 contains a good statement of the
law. There the rule for charitable deductions where the remainderman
is a charity and the trustee has a power of invasion for the life tenant,
as established by a line of cases, including several from the Supreme
Court, was stated. The rule is that a charitable deduction is allowed
if (1) the trustee's power of invasion is limited to an ascertainable standard capable of being stated in terms of money, and (2) the facts at the
time of the transfer show the likelihood of invasion and the value of the
power of invasion under the circumstances. The court in McHugh held
these principles applicable where the question involved the gift tax on a
trust between private parties. Note, however, that section 2037 is concerned with the value immediately before the decedent's death, rather
47
than at the time of the transfer.
Congress seems originally to have intended certain gift tax rules
regarding valuing invasion rights to apply in valuing reversionary interests. In 1949 the Conference Committee in regard to section 2037
wrote:
The decendent's reversionary interest is to be valued by recognized valuation principles... and, of course, without regard to the
fact of the decendent's death. The value shall be ascertained as
though the decedent were, immediately before his death, making
a gift of the property and retaining the reversionary interest. The
rule of Robinette v. Helvering (318 U.S. 184), under which a
reversionary interest not having an ascertainable value under
recognized valuation principles is considered to have a value of
zero, is to apply. Thus, if a reversionary interest consisting of a
right enforceable in equity to compel a trustee to apply trust
corpus for the support and maintenance of the grantor would be
considered to have a value of zero for gift tax purposes were it
§ 20.2037-1 (c) (3).
"142 F. Supp. 927 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
"This is the reason that the gift tax and estate tax under § 2037 are not

mutually exclusive. In principle, on this point § 2038 is similar.
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being retained under a transfer by gift, it is to be48similarly valued
for the purpose of the conference amendments.
However, as noted earlier the regulations do not expressly incorporate
any gift tax rules but rather adopt a fair market value rule regardless
of the non-applicability of actuarial rules. Moreover, Congress seems
to have receded from its original position. The House and Senate Reports on the 1954 Code in connection with section 2037 state:
The decedent's reversionary interest is to be valued by recognized
valuation principles and without regard to the fact of decedent's
death. Where it is apparent from the facts that property could
have reverted to the decedent under contingencies that were not
too remote, the reversionary interest is not to be necessarily remerely because the value thereof
garded as having no value 49
cannot be measured precisely.
Although the case did not involve valuing a power of invasion, in
Estate of Cardesa,50 decided in 1958, the court relied, among other
things, on the 1949 conference report above quoted and held that where
an actuarial conclusion would be but a guess the reversionary interest
must be considered to have a valuation of zero. It does not appear that
the fair market value of the interest was considered. The issue in Cardeza was the valuation of a reversionary interest for the five per cent
limitation in section 2037.
Turning now to the gift tax law to which reference has been made
above, Revenue Ruling 54-53851 seems to indicate the Commissioner's
view.

Prior to this ruling ChristiannaK. Gramnm5 2 had held that where

the grantor put all her income-producing property, valued at eightythree thousand dollars, in trust, reserving a life estate and giving the
trustee power to invade corpus for the "comfort, education, maintenance
or support" of the grantor, there had been no taxable gift to the remainderman. The Tax Court considered, in view of the moderate amount
of the corpus, that the right of invasion for grantor's comfort, though the
amount was incapable of determination, would very probably be exercised to a substantial extent. This holding on the surface seemed contrary to Smith v. Shaughnessy53 and Robinette v. Helvering,54 which
the Commissioner in the Revenue Ruling summarized:
The law in those cases is that where a donor transfers property
retaining a reversionary interst which is capable of valuation by
"'H.R. Rep. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949), 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
81st Cong., First Sess., 1949, at 2185, 2186.
3 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADm. NEws, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1954, at 4457, 5113.
o261 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1958).
316.
=' 1954-2 C.B.
-217 T.C. 1063 (1951).

SERV.,

52318 U.S. 176 (1943).
"318 U.S. 184 (1943).
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recognized actuarial methods, the value of the retained interest
should be excluded from the gift, but where the value of the reversionary interest is not susceptible of valuation by recognized
actuarial methods, the entire gift is complete."
The Commissioner said that the Gramm case should be viewed in light
of the unusual and particular circumstances of the case. The Revenue
Ruling then held that even in such a case as Gramm the amount required
for the grantor's support in his accustomed mode of living may be
ascertained and valued as an annuity and the excess of the corpus over
the retained rights would be a gift. The Commissioner, on the point of
ascertaining the extent of invasion, cited two cases: Ithaca Trust Co. v.
United States 6 and Blodget v. Delaney.5 7 These cases deal with ascertaining invasion rights for determining a charitable deduction. In both
cases the courts, as was done in Gramm, recognized the propriety of
looking to the extrinsic facts to determine likelihood of invasion.
It is submitted that there is no reason why the principles used in
valuing a reversionary interest in the gift tax and charitable deduction
cases, especially the reference to extrinsic facts, should not be applicable
to valuing the reversionary interest for the five per cent limitation in
section 2037. It is noted that the regulations under section 2037 do not
adopt the gift tax rule of Robinette as stated by the Conference Committee of 1949, but reflect the approach indicated in the 1954 Congressional Report. However, as noted above, Estate of Cardeza proceeded
on the rule reflected in the 1949 Conference Committee Report notwithstanding the 1954 Congressional Report.
Conclusion
It seems that where the trustee has been given a discretionary right
to invade corpus conditioned on a fixed standard the grantor is deemed
to have a reversionary interest within the purview of section 2037 by
reason of the right in equity to enforce the standard of invasion. In
determining the crucial question of whether the value of the reversionary
interest exceeds five per cent of the transferred property, although there
are no cases squarely in point, it seems that the likelihood and extent of
invasion are to be determined in view of the standard of the trust instrument together with the extrinsic circumstances. It is arguable that if
the interest cannot be actuarially valued it will be deemed to have a
zero value; however, the Commissioner could invoke the fair market
value rule provided in the Regulations.
558279
1954-2
C.B.
317.
U.S.
151at (1929).
"201 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1953). See especially Mr. Chief Judge Magruder's
interesting concurring opinion at 594.
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III. REMEDIES FOR EXISTING TRUSTS
The following section is designed to point out at least some of the
problems that will be encountered and the avenues that will be available
should a grantor of an existing trust of the type herein considered desire
to avoid inclusion of the corpus in his gross estate.
Tax Considerations
Any action will, of course, be subject to the catch-all estate tax regulation 58 providing: "If a decedent transfers an interest in property or
relinquishes a power in contemplation of death, the decedent's gross
estate includes the property subject to the interest or power to the extent
that it would be included under section 2036, 2037 or 2038 if the decedent had retained the interest or power until his death."
It now appears as to the type trust herein considered that a gift tax
on the whole corpus may not be proper. Under the Paolozzi and Vander
Weele concept, the full value of a life estate, i.e., the income interest,
should not be taxable 59 nor should the amount of principal determined
to be under the grantor's control because of the trustee's duty to invade
pursuant to a fixed standard. 60
If a gift tax has been paid on the above stated basis it follows that
another gift tax is due upon the relinquishment, termination, or assignment of the interests originally reserved which have never been subjected to a gift tax. 61 If there has been an appreciation in the value of
the corpus, the value of the subsequent gift, i.e., the relinquishment or
62
assignment, will be calculated on the increased value, it seems.
If a gift tax has been levied on the theory that the full value of the
property constituted a taxable gift--either because the parties were not
cognizant of the authorities and arguments indicating the contrary, 63 or
if so aware, because they doubted the validity thereof-then determining
subsequent gift tax consequences will be more difficult. The Commis§ 20.2035-1(b).
§ 25.2511-2(b) appears to hold a contrary view, but it does not appear that
the right of creditors to reach the full income under local law is considered.
"0The regulation, § 25.2511-2(b), seems in accord with this statement. See also
McHugh v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 927 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
015 MERTENS §§ 35.01, .02 (1959).
62 See § 2512 and §§25.2512-5(a),
(c). In Blumberg v. Smith, 138 F.2d 956
(7th Cir. 1943), where the taxpayer created two trusts, in 1936 and 1937 respectively, and, believing a gift tax to be due thereon, paid it. Then in 1939 it became
apparent that because of powers retained the gifts were incomplete and thus no
gift tax was due thereon. Then taxpayer relinquished the retained powers. In
the meantime the trusts had substantially appreciated in value. It was held that a
gift tax was due on the trusts at the value at the time of relinquishment; however,
the taxpayer was in a position to recover the first tax erroneously paid.
" The theory that creditor's rights against the settlor-beneficiary's discretionary
trust result in the retention of an interest by the grantor has developed in the gift
and estate tax cases only recently. With the exception of the Herzog case in 1941,
which held for the taxpayer because the court doubted that creditors could reach
the trust under New York law, all the other cases have been decided in the 1950's.
88
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sioner will not, of course, be estopped to claim another gift 4 or an
estate tax, merely because he would have to adopt a position inconsistent with the proper retention of the original gift tax. If a gift tax
was paid on the whole property transferred on the theory that there was
a completed gift, the grantor has the regulation 5 and Uhl" together
with Herzog, Rheinstrom and Hazelton67 to support the propriety of this
position as to the income element. As to the right to compel invasion
all that need be shown to demonstrate a completed gift is that at the
time of the transfer the likelihood of invasion was negligible. 8 If it be
determined that a gift tax on the whole transfer was proper, then the
extinguishment or transfer of either of the retained interests should not
be subject to another gift tax. 6 Moreover, no estate tax should be
levied by reason of the retention of the income expectancy. 70 On the
other hand even though the gift may have been complete notwithstanding
the right to compel invasion, nevertheless an estate tax might be in1
curred by its retention.
As to the grantor's equitable power to cause invasion of principal, if
it be determined that the original gift tax erroneously included an ascertainable amount subject to the grantor's control, then the relinquishment,
termination, or other disposal of it by the grantor completes the gift as
" See Blumberg v. Smith, 138 F.2d 956 (7th Cir. 1943), discussed in note 62
supra. This Comment will not consider under what circumstances a refund can
be obtained. See also § 2504 and regulations thereunder.
" § 25.2511-2(b): "For example, if a donor transfers property to another in
trust to pay the income to the donor or to accumulate it in the discretion of the
trustee, . . . [and provides] that the remainder should go to X or his heirs, the
entire transfer would be a completed gift."
"The Court of Appeals version from which it can be argued that unless it is
clearly shown that the state rule allows creditors to reach the discretionary income,
the Commissioner has failed to make out his case.
87 Recall, however, that in Rheinistrom and Hazelton no consideration was given
to the right of creditors to reach income.
08 See § 25.2511-2(b) ; Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943) ; McHugh
v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 927 (Ct. Cl. 1950). As a practical matter if there
has been an appreciation in the value of the corpus the grantor will want to urge
a completed gift.
9 See Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 285 (1933) ; "Congress did not mean
that the tax should be paid twice, or partly at one time and partly at another. If
a revocable deed of trust is a present transfer by gift, there is not another transfer
when the power is extinguished. If there is not a present transfer upon the delivery
of the revocable deed, then there is such a transfer upon the extinguishment of
the power." See also Louis J. Kolb, 5 T.C. 588 (1945); Orrin G. Wood, 40
B.T.A. 905 (1939).
70 See Covey, Power to Distribute to Grantor, 98 TRUSTS & ESTATES 322, 326
(1959). The cases support this conclusion. See Vander Weele and Herzog.
7" In connection with § 2037 there may be an instance in which a gift tax or
an estate tax does not exclude the other, unless, as for instance in Vander Weele,
the invasion possibility is valued so high at the original gift as to wholly prevent
any gift tax. This would occur when at the time of the gift the circumstances would
not justify a deduction from the value of the remainder for the invasion possibility,
but because of developments subsequent to the gift, the circumstances immediately
before decedent's death cause an increase in the value of the invasion right. No
case involving this situation has been found.
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to the principal and a gift tax is due on the amount by which the gift of
72
the remainder was incomplete.
If it be determined that the original gift tax was erroneously paid
without excluding the grantor's interest in the income, it is the value of
a full life estate that has been improperly included,73 because, since the
trustee could pay all the net income to the grantor, under the general
rule his creditors could reach that amount. Although no case in point
has been found, reason dictates that should the grantor relinquish or
assign this interest a gift tax will be levied on the value of a life estate
in the corpus at the time of the transfer. 74 The fact that a transferee of
this interest might not be entitled to the full income 75 would be immaterial; it is the *value that the grantor parts with, not what the donee
receives that determines the gift tax.76 However, if the donor retains
an enforceable right to have the taxes paid from the transferred property,
77
the amount of the gift is reduced by the amount of the taxes.
Conveyancing Methods Available
Putting aside tax considerations for a moment, the question arises:
how can the grantor dispose of his interests?
No reason appears why the grantor cannot release, or to use the
tax term, relinquish, his interests and powers. 78 Even if the right to
compel invasion is regarded as "personal" 79 and therefore inalienable 0

it seems that it can be released.81
5 MERTENS §§ 35.01, .02. See also § 2504.
Paolozzi and Vander Weele.
' See § 2504 and regulations thereunder, especially § 25.2504-2.
It would appear
that issues other than valuation are involved. Quaere, in regard to § 25.2504-1 (d),
whether the "erroneous inclusion" referred to means erroneous under the law at
the time, or erroneous in light of the present law. The House and Senate Reports
which are identical are not very enlightening. The material part provides: "It is
believed that once the value of a gift has been accepted for purposes of the tax by
both the Government and the taxpayer, this value should be acceptable to both in
measuring the tax to be applied to subsequent gifts. For that reason the bill provides that the value of a gift as reported on a taxable gift tax return for a prior
year is to be conclusive as to the value of the gift (after the statute of limitations
has run) in determining the tax rate to be applied to subsequent gifts." H.R.
REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1945); 3 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADM. NEws,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1945 at 4120. If neither the power to compel invasion nor
the circuitous right to income were segregated for valuation at the time of the
original gift there is doubt whether this provision would be applicable.
RESTAURANT, TRUSTS (SEcoND) § 156(2) (1959) declares that the transferee
can demand the full income. Contra, Dravo Trust, 79 Pa. D. & C. 79 (1951).
§ 25.2511-2 (a).
Sarah Helen Harrison, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952) ; 5 MERTENs § 36.04.
18 See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 75 A.2d 815 (Del. Chan. 1950);
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (SECOND)

§ 343 (1959).

This Comment will not consider

the various future interests problems that might be encountered. However, it would
not seem that acceleration would occur if the remaindermen were required to survive the grantor, although acceleration is chiefly a question of the grantor's intent.
See SImEs & SMITx, FUaR INTERESTS § 796 (1956).
8' See generally Merchants Nat. Bk. v. Morrissey, 329 Mass. 601, 109 N.E.2d
821 (1953).
soII
Scott, TRUSTS § 160 (1956).
81
RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (SEcoND) §-343(i) (1959).
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It may be that the trust could be revoked8 2 or terminated, depending
on the circumstances. According to the general rule the settlor and beneficiaries, if none are under an incapacity, can cause the termination of
83
an inter vivos trust.
Whether the settlor can assign the interests presents a somewhat more
difficult problem. The beneficiary, other than the settlor, of a discretionary trust cannot make a vaild assignment since he has nothing to
assign.8 4 But the question here is whether the settlor who creates a
discretionary trust in his own favor can assign his income interest thereunder, as well as the right to compel invasion of corpus for his benefit.
There seems to be no case presenting this precise question. It is clearly
established that: (1) a spendthrift trust in favor of the settlor is ineffectual and he may assign his interest and his creditors may reach it ;8, and
(2) that creditors of a discretionary settlor-beneficiary can reach his
interest.8 6 Therefore, it would seem that a settlor-beneficiary of a discretionary trust could make a voluntary assignment.8 7 It has been
reasoned88 that if under local law creditors of the settlor-life beneficiary
of a spendthrift trust could reach the whole income, then the settlorlife beneficiary could make a voluntary assignment. Moreover, the
Restatement of Trusts (Second) section 156(2) clearly makes no distinction between voluntary assignees and creditors, providing: "Where
a person creates for his own benefit . . . a discretionary trust, his
transferee or creditors can reach the maximum amount which the
trustees under the terms of the trust could pay to him or apply for his
benefit." (Emphasis added.)
In Dravo Trust 9 a woman created a trust whereby she was to receive so much net income as the trustees in their discretion determined.
Also there was a spendthrift clause. To avoid estate taxes she assigned
her interest. The assignment was held valid, although the court held,
contrary to the Restatement, that the assignee was entitled only to what
the trustees decided to pay, rather than the whole income.
Since creditors can reach principal 0 as well as income, it would
seem that the same considerations would apply to an assignment of the
82

See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6 (1950).
TRUSTS § 338 (1956).

88 III ScoTr,

Caveat: There may be circumstances
Cf. Cerf v. Commissioner,

where the beneficiaries would be making a gift-back.

141 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1944).

84II
ScoTT, TnusTs § 155 (1956).
85

§ 156.
88Id.
Id. § 156(2).

The court in Vander Weele assumed that the settlor-beneficiary could assign
or transfer
her interest in the trust. 254 F.2d at 898.
88
17

E.g., Byrnes v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1940).

See generally

Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts Created in Whole or it Part for the Benefit of the
Settlor, 44 HIARv. L. REv. 208, 218 (1931) ; GniswoL, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §§ 493,
494 (1947).
8 79 Pa. D. & C. 79 (1951).
" 0Ware v. Gulda, 331 Mass. 68, 117 N.E2d 137 (1954).
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right to compel invasion, unless the right is personal.9 1 Assuming that
the right to compel invasion may be assigned, the problem arises whether
the yardstick-for example, of proper support, maintenance, and education-is to be applied to the assignee's or the grantor's situation. It
might be that the grantor's situation would continue to govern the
propriety of invasion but that the money would be paid to the assignee.
On the other hand, it might be that the trustee would be required to
invade when the assignee's situation qualified under the standard.
While the North Carolina court has not had occasion to deal with
this problem in connection with a trust of the type herein considered,
the statement in Pilkington v. West 92 that one cannot retain an interest
in a trust and restrict the right of alienation thereof strongly suggests
that the court would sustain an assignment of the reserved interests, both
93
of the income and the right to compel invasion.
IV.

RECOmMENDATIONS

While the law governing and affecting the problems discussed in this
Comment is not definitively developed, at least trends and danger areas
are noticeable. It seems particularly clear that a North Carolina grantorbeneficiary of a trust which is absolutely discretionary as to income
distribution is sitting on an estate tax powder keg. Also, it seems that
a right to the return of principal by invasion by the trustee, whether
pursuant to a fixed standard, or in his absolute discretion94 is a potential
estate tax trap.
Consequently, it would seem that it would hardly be advisable to
create a trust of the type herein considered without serious deliberation
as to the tax dangers. Of course, other factors might outweigh the tax
disadvantages.
01 Cf. Merchant's Nat. Bank v. Morrissey, 329 Mass. 601, 109 N.E.2d 821
(1953). II ScoTT, TRUSTS § 160. Most of the personal trust cases involve a right
of occupancy of a house.
246 N.C. 575, 580, 99 S.E.2d 798, 802 (1957).
An interesting income tax question would arise if the assignment were for
value. Where the full net income life beneficiary of a trust sells his interest for a
consideration the amount received is taxable as capital gain. Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943). The case is premised on Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937). In Blair it was held that an assignment of a full
income interest in a trust carried with it an interest in the trust corpus and the
corresponding rights and remedies for the enforcement of the trust. In accord with
Bell's Estate are: Allen v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828 (1946); McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d
235 (2d Cir. 1946) (surrender rather than sale of the life interest). The purchaser
of a life estate, even if he is the remainderman, may amortize the cost of the wasting
capital asset thus acquired over the life expectancy of the measuring life. Bell v.
Harrison, 212 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1954). The question would be, therefore, whether
an assignment of the interests retained by the grantor of the type trust herein considered would be within the scope of Blair.
" See note 37 supra.
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As for existing trusts, unless other advantages are deemed more
important, considering, among other matters, the gamble that an untimely death will claim the grantor before any long range economic
benefits can be derived from the trust, it would seem prudent for the
grantor of such a trust to rid himself of the retained interests. 95
If the assignment is made to a dependent of the grantor great care
should be taken that the transfer is not made with the intent of discharging the legal duty of support. The use, possession, right to income, or other enjoyment of the transferred property is considered retained under section 2036(a) (1) to the extent that it is to be applied
toward the discharge of a legal obligation of the decedent. 0 Where,
however, such is not the intent and the dependent can use the property
without restriction, there is no inclusion in the grantor's gross estate. 7
Moreover, where an independent trustee has absolute discretion whether
or not to distribute to the dependent it has been held that no inclusion
results.98 The cases found involved a trust originally created for the
dependent, but no distinction in principle readily appears where the
grantor transfers his retained interests to a dependent.
If the grantor of an existing trust chooses to make an intra-family
assignment, either for value or gratuitously, it would seem prudent to
provide sufficient limitations over to prevent the re-acquisition by inheritance of the assigned interests should a premature death befall the
principal assignee. It would seem prudent in the assignment to recite
that the grantor recognizes the two interests he retains and that he
expressly assigns both. 99 Then, to assure that the grantor has divested
himself of all the interests, it would seem prudent to execute a release or
relinquishment to the trustee the day following the assignment. Such
release would recite that the grantor has previously made an assignment
and that should it be judicially determined invalid in whole or in part,
the interest the assignment purported to transfer is hereby released.
" In addition to the relative saving as between the estate tax liability and the
tax on a present gift of the retained interests, the possibility that property which
has appreciated in value since acquired must be sold to pay the gift taxes, with the
resultant additional income tax liability, must be considered. See LOWNDES &
KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE & GI=r TAxEs 846 (1956).
08 § 20.2036-1(b) (2) ; Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate, 205 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, Estate of Dwight v. Commissioner, 346 U.S. 871 (1953).
" Colonial-American Nat. Bank v. United States, 243 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1957);
Wishard v. United States, 143 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1944).
"Commissioner v. Douglass' Estate, 143 F.2d 961 (3rd Cir. 1944) ; McCullough
v. Granger, 128 F. Supp. 611 (W.D. Pa. 1955). In the latter case it was considered
insignificant that the trustees were the wife and a son of the grantor, the beneficiary being another son.
" See Merchant's Nat. Bank v. Morrissey, 329 Mass. 601, 109 N.E.2d 821
(1953), where the court seemed reluctant to believe that the grantor intended to
assign a right to demand principal where the assignment was of all "right, title,
and interest."
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Because of the dearth of authorities good practice would seem to
require that the assignment or release or other disposal be tested in the
state courts 00 or that a revenue ruling or closing agreement be sought.
JAMES

S. DOCKERY, JR.

o See Brandis v. Trustees of Davidson College, 227 N.C. 329, 41 S.E.2d 833
(1947), 26 N.C.L. REv. 69 (1947), where trustees sought a declaration regarding
power to sell. It was held that declaratory judgment was inappropriate. Rather,
the court said, a bill for instructions should have been brought.

